Questioning Human Error Probabilities in Railways by Feldmann, Frederike et al.
The 3rd IET International Conference on System Safety, 20 -22 October 2008, NEC, Birmingham, UK 
QUESTIONING HUMAN ERROR PROBABILITIES IN 
RAILWAYS 
F. Feldmann*, M. Hammerl*, S. Schwartz* 
*Institute of Transportation Systems, German Aerospace Center (DLR), Lilienthalplatz 7, 38108 Braunschweig, Germany.  
E-Mail: frederike.feldmann@dlr.de, malte.hammerl@dlr.de, stefanie.schwartz@dlr.de, fax: +49 531 295 3402 
 
 
 
Keywords: Risk analysis, human error probability, human 
error quantification, performance shaping factors, railway 
Abstract 
Human errors are regarded as one of the main causes for 
railway accidents these days. In spite of this fact, the 
consideration of human error probabilities in quantified risk 
analyses has been very rudimentary up to now. A lack of 
comprehensive data and analyses in literature lead to the use 
of estimations and values from other industries. This paper 
discusses the transferability of human error probabilities for 
railways and identifies problems in handling methods and 
values. A model of working systems is used to demonstrate 
the particularities of railway work places and to derive a 
structure for performance shaping factors that influence the 
human error probability. A holistic approach is proposed to 
support the determination of appropriate human error 
probabilities for railways. 
1 Introduction 
The railway system is one of the safest transport systems 
available. Many safety measures have been introduced as a 
response to accidents. By learning from accidents much effort 
has been spent on the development of highly reliable 
technical safety systems. Because of the high safety of the 
technical parts of the railway system it is widely assumed that 
human error is the main cause for accidents nowadays. Thus, 
the awareness to integrate human factors into the design 
process grows. However, the application of human reliability 
assessment (HRA) is not yet common in railway engineering 
practice. There is a need to estimate the probability of human 
errors in railway risk analysis. On the following pages the 
usage of human error probabilities in the railway domain is 
discussed as well as occurring problems and solutions. 
1.1 Current situation 
The railway system’s safety is on a very high level and is 
increased continuously. Over a long period of time the 
railway system developers have tried to design the human, 
regarded as the weakest part, out of the system. The 
proportion of human actions has been reduced, especially 
those that are safety-related. Among other things this has been 
done by introducing technical safety systems that serve as a 
fallback level in case of a human error. But human errors and 
their involvement in accidents persist. This is particularly the 
case in degraded modes of operation where the operator 
becomes a fallback level of the technical system. If in this 
case the operator fails, too, accidents are a likely 
consequence. However, the operator might be able to cope 
with the situation, thus reducing the risk emanating from the 
failure of the technical system.  
Currently, many German risk analyses do not consider human 
actions to a satisfactory extent. They focus on the technical 
part of the system, not modeling the driver, the signaler and 
other human operators carefully. Some analyses simply stop 
as soon as they reach the human-machine-interface. Other 
risk analyses assume that the operator performs his tasks 
perfectly, never making any mistakes. Another common 
practice is to write thick operator’s handbooks to cope with 
the technical deficiencies of the system. These handbooks do 
not consider whether the operator is able to fulfill the 
assigned task or how many errors he might make. 
1.2 The need for numbers  
The CENELEC standard EN 50129 [4] for railway 
applications requires quantitative risk analysis and the 
determination of tolerable hazard rates (THR). The actual 
hazard rate of a safety-related function must not be higher 
than the associated THR. The reliability of functions 
implemented by technical components can in most cases be 
estimated sufficiently. It is usually characterized by a failure 
rate λ from which the hazard rate λ* can be derived. The 
human reliability is usually characterized by the human error 
probability (HEP) which is estimated by the ratio of the 
number n of the observed erroneous actions and the total 
number N of actions to be performed: HEP = n/N. 
Because most safety-related functions are implemented by a 
combination of technical systems and human actions, most 
risk analyses have to consider both: the hazard rates of the 
technical components and the probability of human error.  
 
The probability of human error is relevant for risk analyses in 
all situations where a human operator performs a safety-
related task in co-operation with a technical system. The co-
operation can be of various kinds: The technical system might 
be the tool to perform the task, e.g. a lever to set the train 
speed. The technical system might be a fallback system 
intervening only if the operator makes a mistake, e.g. an 
automatic braking system to prevent overspeed. The human 
operator can act as a fallback system for a technical system, 
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 too, e. g. driving on sight because of a failure of a track clear 
detection device. In all these cases the probability of human 
error is needed to determine the overall system risk. 
1.3 Human error probabilities in risk analysis methods 
There are several methods available for risk analysis: Fault 
Tree Analysis (FTA), Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality 
Analysis (FMECA), Best Practice Risk (BP-Risk) [2], risk 
graph (IEC 61508-5), Braband’s risk formula [2], etc. Some 
methods are quantitative, some are qualitative while others 
are somewhere in between. For a distinction between the 
terms qualitative and quantitative see [9]. 
BP-Risk considers human actions as a fallback level. The 
other methods are mostly used for technical systems only, but 
some of the methods can be expanded to include human error. 
 
Figure 1: Schematic fault tree including human error 
 
Human error probabilities can be applied in quantitative 
methods such as FTA, see figure 1 for a schematic fault tree 
of a system with human / machine redundancy. If the human 
error probability is converted into a hazard rate, it can be used 
in Braband’s risk formula [2], another quantitative method. 
But human error probabilities are useful for qualitative 
methods, too: The common 10 categories of the probability of 
occurrence in a FMECA are often intervals of failure rates. A 
human error probability can be used to select the right 
category.  
The knowledge of human error probabilities is of great value 
for risk analyses. There are situations where numbers are 
needed and there are methods available to process these 
numbers. 
2  Existing human error probabilities and 
quantification techniques 
2.1 Status quo  
In the German railway domain, most risk analyses do not take 
human reliability into account. One of the reasons is a lack of 
available data. The German Federal Railway Authority, the 
Eisenbahn-Bundesamt (EBA) and the Deutsche Bahn AG 
maintain statistics on hazardous events; however, these 
statistics are not publicly available.  
In the UK there are public statistics, e.g. on employee errors. 
The Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) publishes annual reports 
including statistics concerning signals passed at danger 
(SPAD). In spite of the great value of these numbers for 
British risk analyses these statistics cannot be simply 
transferred to other countries. Working conditions of German 
train drivers and signalers differ significantly in signaling and 
train protection systems and safety philosophies.  
Railway incidents and accidents are rare, fortunately. Beside 
that, erroneous actions without any unwanted result for the 
overall system are often not recorded. Consequently, the 
collection of comprehensive data to derive statistically 
reliable information on human error probabilities is difficult.  
In spite of these circumstances, there are a few attempts to 
integrate human reliability in risk analyses for German 
railways, see e. g. [3] and [16]. These analyses try to 
compensate the lack of objective data by the use of generic 
estimations for human error probabilities. For example, there 
is a kind of non written agreement to assign the probability of 
10-3 to any human error. This number was for example used 
in a risk assessment of the German electronic timetable book 
and list of sections with temporary speed restrictions 
(EBuLa). But, instead of being the outcome of an objective 
measurement of human unreliability, the value 10-3 is just a 
hypothetical value used in an example calculation. This was 
revealed by Hinzen in his thesis [8], pp. 44-46. Moreover, 
there is no rationale for assigning the same probability to all 
kinds of human errors. Human beings show a much higher 
variability and complexity than technical components. 
Furthermore, the human error probability depends on several 
influencing factors (so called performance shaping factors, 
PSF) e.g. the quality of training for the task.  
Accident
Failure of 
technical system Human error 
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More sophisticated German railway risk assessments refer to 
the probabilities published by Hinzen [8]. His thesis provides 
different values for human error probabilities in railway 
applications depending on the stress level and the 
environmental conditions. Hinzen compares human error 
probabilities from the literature to a table provided by the 
Electric Power Research Institute. As the values correspond 
well, Hinzen assumes that the validity of the human error 
probabilities is verified. It is however questionable whether a 
pure comparison sufficiently proves the validity of the values. 
A deeper analysis of the origin of the numbers used in the 
comparison reveals that most of the HEPs date back to 
workplaces in the nuclear power plant sector. Hinzen also 
states that the transfer is not unrestrained possible because the 
working conditions vary reasonably between the two 
industries. 
It can be concluded that appropriate human error data for 
railways are not publicly available, in Germany. In addition, 
the validity of values currently used in German railway risk 
assessments should be questioned. To obtain valid values, a 
common approach is the application of human error 
quantification (HEQ) methods, discussed in the next section.  
2.2 Human error quantification techniques 
Instead of giving an overview over the long list of techniques 
available to assess human reliability, this section starts with a 
description of the HEQ-process in risk analysis. Then, the 
methodology of two of the most common techniques is 
described, followed by a summary of some problems with 
these techniques. 
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 In risk analysis, the analysis of possible causes of hazardous 
events specifies those human actions where a corresponding 
error probability is needed. An example of such a human 
action is a train driver closing the doors although a passenger 
stands between the open doors. The goal of the HEQ is then 
to provide a numerical value for that human error.  
One method to provide that value is the Technique of Human 
Error Rate Prediction (THERP) [15]. The first step within 
THERP is to decompose the task (e.g. closing the door) into 
several individual tasks (like: checking visual scene, pushing 
a button). Then a list of HEPs and their respective task 
descriptions in the THERP-handbook is examined and the 
item that corresponds best to the action to be assessed is 
selected. The assessor will normally adjust this so called basic 
probability, depending on the effect of several listed 
performance shaping factors. The desired final value can then 
be calculated on the basis of the individual probabilities using 
prescribed combination rules.  
The process within the Human Error Assessment and 
Reduction Technique (HEART) [18] is similar: The assessor 
compares the task under analysis with generic task types for 
which basic probabilities are provided by the technique. PSFs 
are used to adjust this basic value. The difference between 
these two techniques is the depth of decomposition: While 
THERP is characterized by a high degree of detail in 
modeling, HEART is less detailed.  
Even though it is possible to generate a value for the human 
error probability through the application of HEART or 
THERP, it is important to keep in mind the drawbacks of 
HEQ-techniques in general. Their validity for railways is 
influenced by the lack of objective data (e.g. statistics) and 
the fact that human behavior shows a much higher variation 
than technical components. Different assessors can end up 
assessing different probabilities for the same event using the 
same technique. Or they determine equal probabilities 
although they considered different performance shaping 
factors. In fact, the process how to integrate performance 
shaping factors is not well structured in the methods. Often, 
the influence factors are numerous and interdependent from 
one another. In practice, many assessors only use the PSFs 
rarely [11].  
Moreover, the application of different techniques can lead to 
the assessment of different HEPs for the same event, as 
revealed e.g. by Kim et al. [10] who assessed the probability 
of the event “Driver fails to check signal” with two different 
HEQ-techniques as being either 0.286 or 1.59·10-3.  
Another problem concerning the application of HEQ-
techniques is mentioned by Pasquini et al. in [12]. In their 
study, it is found that the assumptions prior to the 
introduction of the Italian Signal Repetition System did not 
match the operative usage by train drivers. In order to assess 
human reliability for interaction with technical components, it 
is thus vital to perform a qualitative analysis, first.  
Furthermore, traditional risk analysis lacks a way to model 
certain errors of commission [14]. In a fault tree, usually only 
errors of omission are modeled. Only interventions of 
operators that are required from the system point of view are 
considered – and modeled as success or failure. Interventions 
of operators that are not required at that time are not 
considered. In doing so, there is a risk to underestimate the 
probability of human errors using traditional risk analysis 
techniques.  
A complete understanding of human actions, working 
conditions, and influence factors is the essential foundation 
for valid human error identification and quantification.  
2.3 HEQ techniques in railways 
In order to assess human error probabilities in a certain 
domain, an appropriate method has to be selected and 
thoroughly applied to the particular conditions. Traditional 
HEQ-techniques have been adapted to the railway domain; 
this section gives a brief overview. 
In general, the railway industry is yet in progress to integrate 
human factors into system design. The awareness to include 
human reliability into risk analyses grows, however different 
opinions concerning HEQ in the railway can be found in 
literature. On the one hand, Hickling et al., who applied 
HEART for railway signaling tasks conclude that the method 
“was entirely applicable to all the human reliability 
assessment needed to be undertaken to populate the fault tree 
models with quantified human errors” [7]. On the other hand, 
Traub [13] found that the generic tasks within HEART did 
not map well onto railway worker’s job conditions. An 
inspection of the generic tasks within HEART illustrates the 
problem: one of the task types reads: “Completely familiar, 
well-designed, highly practiced, routine task occurring several 
times per hour, performed to highest possible standards by 
highly-motivated, highly-trained, and experienced person, 
totally aware of implications of failure, with time to correct 
potential error, but without the benefit of significant job aids” 
[18]. It is hard to find a task in the railway system where all 
these conditions are fulfilled. Similar problems arise with the 
application of THERP when task elements of a railway 
working environment need to be assessed, but are not 
represented in any of the HEP tables [11].  
This was one main reason for the British Rail Safety and 
Standards Board to develop the so called rail HEQ tool which 
was meant to facilitate the assessment of human reliability 
particularly in the rail context [5]. This quantification 
technique is based on HEART and involves  
a) Replacement of HEART generic task types by a list 
of generic error types  
b) Proposal of rail specific probability values 
c) Revision of PSFs provided by HEART to rail-
specific PSFs. 
According to a case study for the selection of a railway HRA-
method [10], the rail-HEQ tool provided the most appropriate 
framework for railway tasks and environment. But: in rail-
HEQ train drivers of different rolling stock were taken as 
experts in absolute probability judgment workshops. The 
following questions arise: Is it appropriate to use the mean 
value of responses of train drivers of different rolling stock? 
Do train drivers in local traffic and conventional drivers’ cabs 
face the same working conditions as employees driving long 
distance trains? Was taken into account that humans have 
difficulties estimating error probabilities? Did the drivers 
intentionally overestimate their reliability due to social 
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 desirability? Besides, it is questionable weather these HEPs 
can be transferred to German railway applications due to 
differences between national railway systems, train cabs, 
wayside equipment, and train protection systems.  
Finally, it is to resume that the need for human error 
probabilities can actually not be met comprehensively. 
3  Model of Working Systems 
A profound analysis of actual procedures and the human-
machine-interaction represents the starting point for the 
estimation of human error probabilities. Therefore, a model of 
working systems and a detailed task analysis are tools to 
understand railway work places and differences to other 
domains. They contribute to the discussion whether and how 
human error quantification techniques can be transferred to 
the railway domain. 
3.1 Basic model 
In this chapter, a model covering a wide range of ergonomics 
and human factors issues is presented. The model was first 
published in [6] and is applied to the railway domain. The 
visualization supports the sound analysis of railway work 
places and the identification of relevant PSFs.  
 
 
Figure 2: Model of working systems, basis 
 
The model of working systems starts by defining the work 
system core as an interaction of a human, his task, and his 
instruments. These three items are presented in the center of 
figure 2. In the model, physical as well as organizational 
factors are regarded as influencing factors on the work system 
core. Additionally, the work depends on personal factors of 
the human. Physical factors not only represent the set of 
classic ergonomics, such as anthropometric design, light, and 
climate conditions etc. The design of the human-machine-
interface and its usability belong to physical influencing 
factors as well. Age, health, motivation, and experience can 
be regarded as examples for personal factors. The 
organization also has an influence on the work system core 
through managing working conditions with roster planning, 
employee education and training, social programs, and its 
safety culture. Standards and guidelines also belong to 
organizational influencing factors. It is clear that some of the 
organizational measures have an impact on personal factors, 
see the small arrow at the bottom of figure 2. For example the 
roster planning has an influence on the fatigue. These 
influencing factors have a continuous influence on the work 
system core and are less dynamic. In contrary, the horizontal 
axis represents the work system in the moment of operation: 
inputs can change dynamically. Via the work system core, 
influencing factors as well as input factors have an impact on 
the work output on the right hand side.  
3.2 Human representation in the model 
For the application of this model to railway work places, a 
second layer was added to the core of the work system. This 
is due to the high mental part of the train driver’s and the 
signaler’s work. How the influencing factors take effect on 
the human cognition can either be interpreted as a second 
layer of cognitive reaction behind the work system core or as 
a zoom on the human in the work system (figure 3 as the new 
center of figure 2). In either way, there is a tight interaction 
between the psychological issues and the work system basic 
representation. Phenomena like workload, stress, vigilance, 
and situation awareness shall here be understood as dependent 
from the influencing factors. For example, vigilance depends 
on the fatigue (personal factor), the roster planning 
(organizational factor), and in a certain way on the design of 
the human-machine-interaction as well – think of the dead-
man’s device for train drivers. 
 
 
Figure 3: Model of working systems, layer of cognitive 
reaction 
 
The modular setting of the model enables to add other human 
representations, for example as further layers in the center of 
the model (not depicted). Wickens’ model of resources [17] 
can be interpreted as a third layer or a deeper zoom into 
human cognition. 
In the model, the perspective of ergonomists and engineers is 
merged with psychological approaches. The integration of the 
two axes, the work process (horizontal axis) and the 
influencing factors (from the top and the bottom), helps to 
visualize and to separate independent (influencing and input 
factors) and dependent variables. With the influencing 
factors, functional chains between modifications and 
corresponding results for railway operation and safety can be 
set up (see [6]). They support the analysis of where the 
highest potentials for the reduction of human error can be 
found.  
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 3.3 Railway application 
In this section, the working system of train drivers is 
considered. Performance shaping factors are presented 
according to the structure of the model. The new six classes 
offer a better overview compared to existing HEQ-
techniques: 
 
• Input 
• Physical factors 
• Personal factors, influenced by organizational factors 
• Personal factors, not-influenced by organizational factors 
• Organizational factors, with impact on personal factors 
• Organizational factors, without impact on personal 
factors 
 
In an analysis of the scope of the classes, performance 
shaping factors were identified – some from existing human 
reliability assessment techniques were assorted and realigned. 
Concurrently, an example is given by the application to the 
train driver working system: 
 
Input: 
• Track observation 
• Information obtained by signals (signal aspects) 
• Information obtained by cab instruments 
• Radio communication 
• Weather conditions 
• Delay 
• Degraded modes of operation (e.g. due to signal failure, 
construction work etc.) 
 
Physical factors: 
• Design of human-machine-interface on board: 
usability of instruments (consistency, compatibility, 
dependability, correctness, directness, clarity) 
• Design of wayside infrastructure: 
usability of signaling system; positioning of signals 
• Physical working conditions 
• Design of documents 
 
For space reasons, the last four classes are not listed 
comprehensively as their characteristics are less railway-
specific. For train drivers, work and vehicle experience, rule 
and route knowledge, risk perception and awareness, trust, 
fatigue, and motivation can be mentioned as personal factors 
that may be influenced by the organization. The output of a 
train driver’s working system represents control of the train 
movement, additionally communication to staff and 
passengers. 
 
While applying performance shaping factors to the train 
drivers’ task, a list of particularities becomes apparent. The 
following set should not be understood as a complete list, but 
as an explanation of differences. Of course, the train driver 
has a mobile work environment and a single person job. 
Consider input and physical factors: driving a vehicle instead 
of working in a control center implicates input from trackside 
and onboard devices. Additionally, sight conditions and 
vehicle control differ due to high influence of weather and 
time of day. Unless a continuous train control system with 
cab signaling is installed, trackside signals only offer a short 
time window to perceive the signal aspect – in spite of their 
high importance. In several cases, information is displayed far 
before the operator has to perform an action, e. g. the 
application of brakes must be started at a certain period of 
time after the restrictive signal aspect of the distant signal. 
Concerning organizational factors, it is to state that a large set 
of rulebooks and a complex composite of degraded modes, 
corresponding operations and procedures are particular for 
German the train driver working system. Nowadays, the task 
involves a high mental and supervisory part. The driver has a 
high degree of responsibility, but a low degree of movement 
control; movement authorities are given by the signaler. The 
task is characterized by modern automation mechanisms, 
monotony in normal operation and a sudden involvement in 
degraded modes. Bainbridge’s well known ironies of 
automation [1] are apparent and train drivers are susceptible 
to the out-of-the-loop-syndrome and loss of skills. Finally, 
train drivers face high and continuous risk awareness due to 
their own driving and the fear and a psychological impact of 
suicide victims. 
Obviously, the workplace of the train driver includes some 
very particular working conditions. We argue that some of 
them can hardly be modeled by methods developed for the 
nuclear domain. 
3.3 Holistic approach 
This paper proposes a holistic approach to analyze the actual 
working conditions and the interaction between the operator 
and his instruments and wayside equipment. A hierarchical 
task analysis is one of the tools that can support this 
systematic analysis of the interaction and the interfaces.  
Often, a certain action of the human operator is isolated to 
estimate the human reliability during interaction with a 
technical component. This represents the point of view of the 
safety engineer calculating the reliability of an element in the 
fault tree. This method lacks an analysis of tasks the operator 
has to perform in parallel at that point of time, and therefore 
lacks an understanding of the cognitive demands in that 
moment. The task analysis should not only focus on certain 
tasks but on the entire task scope of the operator.  
As a following step, cognitive demands can be derived. This 
step supports the analysis of the work load for concrete 
scenarios. By dint of this analysis, in a following step, failure 
types can be identified. Here, errors of commission are 
integrated into the considerations. This analysis of the tasks, 
connected cognitive demands, and possible human errors is 
the sound basis to quantify human error probabilities as a next 
step.  
4 Conclusion and outlook 
In the first chapter, the need for probabilities was outlined. 
The following section showed that current practice for human 
error estimation in the German railway domain does not 
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 represent a sound approach. Fixed values, used in the 
railways, do not suit the complexity of human error. The 
empirical foundation of some values is also arguable (e.g. the 
number of 10-3) or date back to different industries. Even 
Hinzen’s discussion of probabilities does not answer the 
question of transferability to the railway domain 
satisfactorily. Human error quantification techniques exist 
and support the calculation; however some drawbacks 
concerning their validity for railway work places were shown. 
In section 3, a model for working systems was presented and 
the working conditions for German train drivers were briefly 
analyzed. Especially the train driver’s task differs 
significantly from control center work stations, for example in 
the electric power industry. The great differences support 
doubts whether classic human reliability assessment methods 
like THERP are fully applicable to the railway domain.  
The model and the performance shaping factors were not only 
presented to outline the differences of railway work places to 
other domains, but also as an approach to another way to 
understand human factors in railways. The modular layout 
enables an easy interpretation of human-machine-interaction 
for work system designers, reliability assessors, and 
psychologists. A new division of performance shaping factors 
was presented and applied to the railway domain. The 
determination of independent and dependent variables 
supports the identification of potentials for human error 
reduction.  
For a new, holistic approach, this paper tried to outline the 
first steps: start with a profound qualitative analysis of the 
working system to understand the human-machine-
interaction. Then, a cognitive analysis and workload 
assessment for the entire task scope represent the following 
steps on the way to human error probabilities. Here, the new 
understanding of performance shaping factors may help to 
reorganize basic human error probabilities and corresponding 
impacts. Existing techniques for quantification of human error 
can serve as a basis and can be adapted to future needs in 
railway systems in a next step.  
 
The items on the most promising and one of the most 
important functional chain are design of human-machine-
interaction, cognitive demands, workload, human error, and 
their impact on railway operation performance and safety. In 
order to consider this line, the Institute of Transportation 
Systems operates a laboratory where subject studies will 
support railway human factors research. 
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